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Abstract: As the number of frozen human embryos continues to rise daily, with numbers not expected to fall, an answer must 
be found to this dilemma. Four possible solutions have been suggested: a) thaw the embryos and allow them to perish; b) thaw 
them and donate them for biomedical research; c) thaw them and donate them in adoption; and d) leave them frozen indefinitely. 
This paper will evaluate the morality of these four possible solutions, particularly frozen human embryo adoption in the light 
of the Magisterium of the Catholic Church, which in its Instruction Dignitas Personae, appears to have opted to consider this 
practice as illicit. We also review the various stances of expert moralists in favour of or against frozen human embryo adoption, 
and we reflect on the extent to which the doctrine contained in Dignitas Personae can bind the moral conscience of the Catholic 
faithful. Finally, we make a personal evaluation of frozen human embryo adoption, in an attempt to find moral reasons that 
substantiate the negative opinion manifested by the Catholic Magisterium on this matter. 
Key words: frozen human embryos, solutions to the frozen state, frozen human embryo adoption, moral assessment, Magis-
terium of the Catholic Church
Evaluación moral de la adopción de embriones humanos congelados a la luz del Magisterio de la Iglesia Católica
Resumen: Cada día aumenta el número de embriones humanos congelados y no se prevé que su número disminuya, por 
lo que parece necesario buscar una solución a este problema. Se han planteado cuatro posibles: a) descongelarlos y dejarlos 
morir; b) descongelarlos y donarlos para investigaciones biomédicas; c) descongelarlos y donarlos en adopción; y d) dejarlos 
congelados indefinidamente. En este trabajo se evalúa la moralidad de estas cuatro posibles soluciones, y especialmente de la 
adopción de los embriones humanos congelados, a la luz del Magisterio de la Iglesia Católica, que en su Instrucción Dignitas 
Personae se pronuncia por la ilicitud de dicha práctica. También se revisan distintas posturas de moralistas expertos favorables 
o no a la adopción de embriones humanos congelados. Igualmente se reflexiona sobre en qué medida la doctrina contenida 
en Dignitas Personae puede obligar a la conciencia moral de los fieles católicos. Finalmente se realiza una evaluación personal 
de la adopción de embriones humanos congelados tratando de buscar razones morales que fundamenten el por qué del juicio 
negativo manifestado por el Magisterio Católico. 
Palabras clave: embriones humanos congelados, soluciones al estado de congelación, adopción de embriones humanos conge-
lados, valoración moral, Magisterio de la Iglesia Católica
Avaliação moral de adoção de embriões humanos congelados, em consideração ao Magistério da Igreja Católica
Resumo: Cada dia aumenta o número de embriões humanos congelados e não se espera o número diminua, portanto parece 
necessário encontrar uma solução para este problema. Foram levantadas quatro possíveis: a) descongelá-los e deixá-los mor-
rer; (b) descongelá-los e doá-los para pesquisa biomédica; (c) descongelada-los e doá-los para adoção; e (d) deixá-los congelados 
indefinidamente. Nesse trabalho se avalia a moralidade dessas quatro possíveis soluções e especialmente a adoção de embriões 
humanos congelados à luz do Magistério da Igreja Católica, que em sua instrução Dignitas Personae, opta pela ilegalidade da 
prática. Também se revisam posturas diferentes dos moralistas especialistas favoráveis ou não à adoção de embriões humanos 
congelados. Igualmente, reflete-se sobre como a doutrina contida na Dignitas Personae pode obrigar a consciência moral dos 
fiéis católicos.Finalmente se realiza uma avaliação pessoal da adoção de embriões humanos congelados pretendendo buscar 
razões morais que fundamentem o porquê do juízo negativo manifestado pelo magistério católico. 
Palavras-chave: embriões humanos congelados, soluções para o estado de congelamento, adoção de embriões humanos con-
gelados, valoração moral, Magistério da Igreja Católica
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Introduction
The number of frozen embryos is increasing dai-
ly, and although there are no reliable worldwide 
statistics, the figure is likely to exceed one and a 
half million; there were around 400,000 in the 
United States in 2003(1), while it is thought that 
in Spain, the number could exceed 200,000(2). 
These figures are not expected to fall, since to in 
order to make in-vitro fertilisation (IVF) more ef-
fective, and to reduce the risk of women having 
to undergo repeated hormonal stimulation, more 
embryos are produced than are transferred, so nat-
urally, surplus embryos are frozen.
The situation of frozen embryos, unjust and ir-
reparable, is unworthy of a human being, so a so-
lution must be found for them. Four have been 
suggested: a) they can be transferred to a woman, 
the biological mother or another; b) they can be 
used for biomedical research; c) they can be left 
frozen indefinitely and d) they can be thawed and 
subsequently allowed to perish(3). 
Of these solutions, the first seems to be ethical-
ly best, as adoption by a woman other than the 
biological mother is the solution that offers most 
options for releasing the frozen human embryos 
from their irremediable and negative situation. 
This option has become known as frozen human 
embryo adoption (hereinafter simply “embryo 
adoption”).
We have already referred to this previously in two 
articles in which we analysed the technical aspects 
of human embryo freezing(4), and various ethical 
aspects of this practice(5). In the latter, we referred 
to the ethics of embryo adoption from the per-
spective of philosophical ethics, moral philosophy 
and two monotheistic religions: Islam and Juda-
ism. In this article we will refer to the moral evalu-
ation that embryo adoption merits in the light of 
the Magisterium of the Catholic Church.
Magisterium of the Catholic Church on frozen 
embryo adoption
There are two documents in the Magisterium of 
the Catholic Church that more or less address 
the issue of embryo adoption: the Instruction 
Donum Vitae, published by the Congregation for 
the Doctrine of the Faith in 1978(6), and Digni-
tas Personae, published on 8 September 2008, by 
the same Congregation(7); the latter was signed 
by Cardinal Levada, then Prefect of the aforemen-
tioned Congregation, and ratified by his Holiness 
Pope Benedict XVI.
Certainly the Instruction Donum Vitae does not 
directly address the topic of frozen human embryo 
adoption, but it does state that “those embryos 
(produced by IVF) that are not transferred into 
the body of the mother and are called spare are 
exposed to an absurd fate, with no possibility of 
their being offered means of survival which can 
be licitly pursued”(6). The Congregation for the 
Doctrine of the Faith may not have been specifi-
cally referring to embryo adoption, but it appears 
that by stating “with no possibility of their being 
offered means of survival which can be licitly pur-
sued”, it wants to underline that voluntary “rescue” 
(of frozen embryos) is not a licit option. However, 
what can be assumed from the aforementioned 
text, I believe without fear of contradiction, is that 
the moral assessment of embryo adoption cannot 
be considered closed with the teachings in Donum 
Vitae, and that consequently the topic remains 
open to further discussion.
The Instruction Dignitas Personae was later pub-
lished, the last document of the Magisterium of 
the Catholic Church in which the topic of embryo 
adoption is explicitly addressed(7). Point 18 of the 
Instruction states: “The majority of embryos that 
are not used remain “orphans”. Their parents do 
not ask for them and at times all trace of the par-
ents is lost. This is why there are thousands upon 
thousands of frozen embryos in almost all coun-
tries where in-vitro fertilization takes place”. Con-
tinuing, in point 19: “With regard to the large 
number of frozen embryos already in existence the 
question becomes: what to do with them? Some of 
those who pose this question do not grasp its ethi-
cal nature, motivated as they are by laws in some 
countries that require cryopreservation centers to 
empty their storage tanks periodically. Others, 
however, are aware that a grave injustice has been 
perpetrated and wonder how best to respond to 
the duty of resolving it.
Proposals to use these embryos for research or for the 
treatment of disease are obviously unacceptable be-
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cause they treat the embryos as mere “biological 
material” and result in their destruction. The pro-
posal to thaw such embryos without reactivating 
them and use them for research, as if they were 
normal cadavers, is also unacceptable. It should be 
noted that, in this text of Dignitas Personae, no al-
lusion is made to a fourth possibility, which is to 
leave them frozen indefinitely, included in most 
texts that make reference to the possible solutions 
that may be given to frozen human embryos(4).
The proposal that these embryos could be put at 
the disposal of infertile couples as a treatment for 
infertility is not ethically acceptable for the same 
reasons which make artificial heterologous pro-
creation illicit as well as any form of surrogate 
motherhood; this practice would also lead to other 
problems of a medical, psychological and legal na-
ture.
It has also been proposed, solely in order to al-
low human beings to be born who are otherwise 
condemned to destruction, that there could be a 
form of “prenatal adoption”. This proposal, praise-
worthy with regard to the intention of respecting 
and defending human life, presents however vari-
ous problems not dissimilar to those mentioned 
above.
All things considered, it needs to be recognized 
that the thousands of abandoned embryos repre-
sent a situation of injustice which in fact cannot be 
resolved. Therefore John Paul II made an “appeal to 
the conscience of the world’s scientific authorities 
and in particular to doctors, that the production 
of human embryos be halted, taking into account 
that there seems to be no morally licit solution re-
garding the human destiny of the thousands and 
thousands of ‘frozen’ embryos which are and re-
main the subjects of essential rights and should 
therefore be protected by law as human persons”.
That is to say, this Instruction of the Magisterium 
of the Catholic Church seems to clearly specify 
the three possibilities for resolving the problem of 
the aforementioned frozen embryos. 
The first two, being used for research or therapeu-
tic uses, are morally illicit for the reasons stated 
in the text, as is the third. Two solutions would 
therefore remain: use them as a “treatment for in-
fertility”, or “prenatal adoption”.
According to Dignitas Personae(7), using them 
as “treatment for infertility” is considered mor-
ally illicit for the same reasons that make assisted 
reproduction illicit, so it can be inferred that the 
ecclesiastical Magisterium is not in favour of this 
practice either.
As regards “prenatal adoption”, Dignitas Personae 
does not assess this as ethically positive either, be-
cause it presents ethical “problems not dissimilar 
to those mentioned above”. However, we will re-
turn to these considerations later, given that it is 
the main aim of this paper.
Magisterial scope of Dignitas Personae
Before beginning this reflection, we believe it is 
important to consider to what extent this Instruc-
tion binds the moral conscience of the Catholic 
faithful, since this will determine whether we 
must morally comply with the teachings con-
tained within it, which in turn will depend on the 
magisterial scope attributed to Dignitas Personae. 
In this regard, first of all it can be said, according 
to Ladaria Ferrer(8), that Dignitas Personae is an 
“Instruction of a doctrinal nature”, issued by the 
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith and 
expressly approved by the Sovereign Pontiff, ac-
cording to the following clause included at the end 
of the document: “The Sovereign Pontiff Benedict 
XVI, in the Audience granted to the undersigned 
Cardinal Prefect on 20 June 2008, approved the 
present Instruction, adopted in the Ordinary Ses-
sion of this Congregation, and ordered its publica-
tion”.
This papal approval implies the ratification of the 
decision, i.e. taking it as valid and making it bind-
ing, so it must be accepted at least as regards its 
legal effects(9).
Therefore, Dignitas Personae belongs to those 
documents which are “ordinary Magisterium of 
the successor of Peter”, in accordance with that 
specified in the Instruction Donum Veritatis(10). 
This opinion is corroborated by the Spanish Epis-
copal Conference(11), which states that Dignitas 
Personae is “an Instruction of a doctrinal nature”, 
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issued by the Congregation for the Doctrine of 
the Faith and expressly approved by the Holy Fa-
ther Benedict XVI, so it belongs to the documents 
that form part of “the ordinary Magisterium of the 
Sovereign Pontiff”(10). Therefore, this Instruction 
should be accepted by the faithful with “religious 
assent” of their spirit(11).
What, however, does “religious assent” to the 
Magisterium mean? In the opinion of Pérez de 
Heredia(12), and according to Canon 752 of 
the Code of Canon Law(13, canon 752), “when 
it comes to doctrinal documents of the Pontifical 
Commissions, approved by the Pope, which make 
reference to theological arguments, the attitude of 
believers to these teachings cannot be obedience 
of divine and Catholic faith, nor firm and defini-
tive assent, owing to the teachings of the Ordinary 
or Extraordinary Universal Magisterium(13, can-
on 250); however, Catholics certainly have a duty 
to acknowledge the intellect and truth to those 
proposals, assent which is not only an external 
attitude, with formal obedience, without opposi-
tion or indifference, but which requires an atti-
tude of inward obedience of the will. This attitude 
is called “religious assent and obedience”, because 
it is based on the faith of the Church. Therefore, 
the statements made in the Instruction Dignitas 
Personae should be accepted by the Catholic faith-
ful.
However, it should be added that “religious as-
sent” does not prevent the faithful from promot-
ing research initiatives regarding this Magisteri-
um, nor does it ban the intellectual work itself(13, 
canon 218), since as Ratzinger(14) sustains, “in 
the course of her history, certain truths have been 
defined as having been acquired though the Holy 
Spirit’s assistance and are therefore perceptible 
stages in the realization of the original promise. 
Other truths, however, have to be understood still 
more deeply before full possession can be attained 
of what God, in his mystery of love, wished to 
reveal to men for their salvation”.
That is, it seems that we must give a nod of “reli-
gious assent” to the statements made in Dignitas 
Personae with respect to embryo adoption, but 
without this entailing (in our opinion) a ban on 
any believer or institution studying the matter in 
depth, to better understand, to the extent pos-
sible, what God has decided to reveal to men for 
their salvation. 
Opinions in favour of embryo adoption
Many documents have been published by various 
authors in the period between 1987 and 2008 re-
lated with the moral licitness of embryo adoption 
that cannot be referred to herein, although most 
have been included in the book “Human Embryo 
Adoption”, by Berg and Furton(15), edited 30 
June, 2006.
Nonetheless, we think it more interesting to look 
at what some authors, in our opinion of right con-
science, say about embryo adoption following the 
publication of Dignitas Personae. As we have men-
tioned, this is the last document of the Catholic 
Church in which the moral classification that this 
action merits is specified, because as we have al-
ready discussed, the statements in this document 
should be accepted by the Catholic faithful with 
“religious assent”.
In this regard, López Barahona, Lucas and An-
tuñano believe that the causes that contribute to 
the existence of frozen embryos, namely IVF, not 
transferring all the embryos generated to the uter-
us and freezing of surplus embryos, are ethically 
negative. However, thawing the embryo, an act 
which is different to the previous, can be positive 
or negative, depending not only on the object of 
the act, but also on the circumstances and the end 
for which the subject acts. Accordingly, if the act 
of thawing is aimed at restoring the embryo to its 
normal biological status and transferring it to the 
womb of a woman, it is morally licit in that the 
intentionality of the subject is to save the life of 
that frozen embryo. In contrast, it will be a nega-
tive act in itself, if done to manipulate or get rid 
of the embryo, or if after thawing it is not offered 
the possibility of a womb, because in this case the 
thawing process would be the direct and formal 
cause of its death.
These authors therefore believe that what deter-
mines the morality is the intentionality of the act, 
which should primarily be the good of the em-
bryo, i.e. that the child born is wanted for himself, 
not for what he brings to the parents or for their 
own interest. This, in their opinion, would legiti-
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mise embryo adoption, as the intentionality of the 
act would fundamentally be to save a human life, 
although a side effect, also positive, would be to 
have a child. For these reasons, they consider that 
embryo adoption, while not a universal solution 
to the problem, is nevertheless the only viable way 
of offering and allowing these embryos the pos-
sibility of development in accordance with their 
human dignity, and an attempt to repair, as far as 
possible, the very serious damage and terrible in-
justice that has already been inflicted upon them.
Another extensive reflection on the morality of 
embryo adoption was made by Javier Siegrist, in 
his final project for his Masters in Bioethics(16). 
After examining the solutions proposed in Dig-
nitas Personae, Siegrist was surprised that this In-
struction proposed to keep the embryos frozen 
indefinitely.
He then evaluated the four possible options. The 
first is to thaw them without transferring them to 
the womb of a woman, so death of the embryo 
is inevitable. Siegrist says that this option is not 
ethically acceptable, since its object is in itself evil. 
The second is thawing them to be used in bio-
medical research, which is not acceptable either, 
because although the end is good, the method is 
not, because it entails death of the embryo. The 
third, keeping them frozen indefinitely (which is 
not included in Dignitas Personae) until they die 
naturally, is apparently compatible with the life of 
the embryo, but Siegrist asks if it is ethical to leave 
embryos in a situation of irremediable indignity 
and negligible quality of life, which he believes is 
not consistent with their human dignity, although 
this does not preclude this option from being 
morally acceptable.
Lastly is prenatal adoption, which, in his opinion, 
is presented as the proposal which, as it satisfies 
the right of the embryo to physical life, seems best 
suited to the dignified treatment that these human 
beings left in this situation of extreme vulnerabil-
ity merit. This proposal approaches what has come 
to be known as embryo “rescue”.
Of the four proposals, Siegrist believes that only 
two are compatible with the right to life of the 
embryo: keeping them frozen indefinitely, or giv-
ing them in adoption.
Pascual also considers that embryo adoption can 
be a licit alternative for those who want but can-
not have children, but “only on condition that the 
adoption process is conducted in the same way as 
in the adoption of children without parents”(17).
Similarly, Gonzalo Miranda believes that embryo 
adoption is licit, since it must be considered that 
these embryos are in a state of abandonment and 
faced with an obvious tragic alternative, so either 
someone adopts them or they will inevitably die. 
Thus, he maintains that in this case the same ethi-
cal and legal criteria should be applied as those 
used to resolve the situation of abandoned chil-
dren already born, since the only possible good for 
the embryo is for someone to accept it, offering it 
a home and love.
Miranda also states that some people think that 
embryo adoption would be a type of surrogacy or 
surrogate motherhood, when in reality they are 
acts with very different objects and meanings. For 
him, surrogate motherhood consists of gestating 
an embryo, substituting the woman who wants to 
be the mother of the child. In embryo adoption, 
however, the practice involves a woman who wish-
es to save the life of a human being in the only way 
possible, while committing to adopting the child 
born as her own child.
Miranda concludes by stating that in the case of 
a frozen human embryo, we have a situation in 
which someone has already committed this moral 
evil, leaving as a result a human embryo destined 
to die. The evil has already been done by others, 
and now what the adoptive mother intends is to 
prevent another evil, the death of the embryo. 
Frozen embryo adoption is therefore not a collab-
oration with the evil done by others, but a gesture 
of solidarity and love towards the creature that has 
been abandoned before birth. 
Other authors hold similar opinions(18,19); even 
the United States Conference of Catholic Bish-
ops(20,21) stated that “although Dignitas Personae 
has not clearly expressed itself on the subject, it 
has not formally issued a definitive judgment con-
trary to this practice”, so it is a topic that morally 
remains open.
Finally, we would like to refer to the opinion of 
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Enrico Massini, coordinator of the John XXIII 
Community, an entity dedicated to embryo adop-
tion with the specific aim of rescuing them from 
their undignified condition. Since many of the 
married couples in this Community already have 
several children, the aim of the adoption is not to 
have a child for fertility reasons, but to save their 
life.
As could not be otherwise, Massini is in favour of 
embryo adoption. He directed his doctoral the-
sis(22) to substantiating this defence, moreover, 
the only dissertation which, to our knowledge, is 
dedicated specifically to the subject discussed.
To begin with, Massini states that the Catholic 
Church has still not taken a definitive stance on 
the morality of embryo adoption, because it is still 
“under discussion within the Church”. Although 
we do not share this assertion, as we will specify 
later, we believe it fitting that he voices it, because 
undoubtedly what has not been pronounced is an 
indispensible requirement to maintain a favour-
able assessment of the moral licitness of embryo 
adoption. Massini starts by determining what he 
considers the moral objective of embryo adoption, 
which in his opinion is “the thawing and trans-
fer to the womb of the woman who accepts the 
cryopreserved embryo”(23). Consequently, this 
specific objective is the one that must be evaluated 
to support, or not, the moral licitness of thawing 
human embryos. This moral classification is deter-
mined to a large extent by the meaning attributed 
to the term “surrogacy”, because it is upon this 
that Dignitas Personae places the moral illicitness 
of embryo adoption.
Therefore, he analyses the meaning of the concept 
of surrogate motherhood, which can be under-
stood as: “a) the woman who carries in pregnancy 
an embryo implanted in her uterus and who is 
genetically a stranger to the embryo because it 
has been obtained through the union of the gam-
etes of “donors”. She carries the pregnancy with a 
pledge to surrender the baby once it is born to the 
party who commissioned or made the agreement 
for the pregnancy; b) the woman who carries in 
pregnancy an embryo to whose procreation she 
has contributed the donation of her own ovum, 
fertilized through insemination with the sperm 
of a man other than her husband. She carries the 
pregnancy with a pledge to surrender the child 
once it is born to the party who commissioned or 
made the agreement for the pregnancy(22). 
However, in our opinion, surrogate motherhood, 
considered as defined here, cannot be applied to 
the surrogacy specified in Dignitas Personae, since 
in this document the child born is adopted by the 
mother who carries the pregnancy, and on no oc-
casion does she gestate it to then donate it. This 
is what essentially defines surrogacy, understood 
as Massini interprets it, a donation that can be al-
truistic, as is the case of a woman who gestates it 
for love or friendship of the woman who cannot 
have children for fertility reasons or who does so 
for financial reasons, which is the surrogacy which 
in its pure form can be called “wombs for rent”.
As a result, Massini understands that the moral 
classification of embryo adoption cannot be con-
sidered under the guise of surrogacy(22), because 
in embryo adoption, this is “radically different as 
regards its end”, which is unquestionably good, 
since it is aimed at providing a woman with the 
child she desires and cannot achieve naturally, 
never donating it to another woman after the 
birth. We are not going to go into depth here on 
the extent to which the intentionality of an ac-
tion can determine its moral licitness, something 
that we shall address more thoroughly later, but it 
is evident that this interpretation of surrogacy is 
what positively determines (in Massini’s opinion) 
the moral licitness of embryo adoption.
Opinions against embryo adoption
Nevertheless, just as there is are a number of mor-
alists and theologians, undoubtedly of right con-
science, who are in favour of embryo adoption, 
there are others, who in accordance with Dignitas 
Personae, do not accept it. In this respect, one of 
the most persuasive arguments against embryo 
adoption, in our opinion, is that held by Nicholas 
Tonti-Filippini(18), who argues that producing 
and accepting a pregnancy with a previously gen-
erated embryo violates the sanctity of the marital 
relationship, because it violates the unitive pur-
pose of marriage. From this stems the premise that 
a woman should only become pregnant as the re-
sult of the conjugal relationship with her husband, 
so becoming pregnant with an embryo generated 
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by any other procedure apart from this relation-
ship seems intrinsically immoral to him.
The Asociación Aggiornamienti Sociali Study 
Group on Bioethics, referring to the adoption 
of frozen embryos, also wonder if it is morally 
licit. According to a document authored by the 
group(23), Dignitas Personae makes it clear that 
the fate of frozen embryos is beyond repair, be-
cause in practice the adoption has objective ele-
ments of moral illicitness. The document does not 
refer to the intention, which in itself is praisewor-
thy, nor to the object (prenatal adoption in itself ), 
which provides a chance of life for some frozen 
human beings, otherwise condemned to destruc-
tion; the authors consider that the moral illicitness 
is due to the circumstances, which for them would 
have insurmountable negativity(24).  
Similarly, for Brian Scarnecchia(25), prenatal 
adoption of frozen embryos sets two moral abso-
lutes against each other: the right to life versus the 
sanctity (sacredness) of marriage. To that end, he 
asks if it is morally licit for a woman to become 
pregnant by heterologous (i.e. not genetically re-
lated) embryo transfer, concluding that it is not, 
since this would make her a surrogate mother, 
which in his opinion is not morally licit.
This illicitness also extends to those who use prena-
tal adoption, not to have a child due to infertility 
issues, but to save the life of a frozen embryo, i.e. 
the altruistic rescue of frozen embryos genetically 
different to the gestational mother. He believes 
that this would be morally similar to heterologous 
embryo transfer, and therefore also morally illicit.
Tad Pacholzyk(20), of the National Catholic Bio-
ethics Center is also against embryo adoption, be-
cause he considers that it would violate the inher-
ent rights of spouses to marital unity, specifically 
the right of the husband to his wife’s body; he also 
adds that methods that violate the nature of mar-
riage cannot be used, specifically their exclusive 
use within the marital relationship. 
Cardinal Antonelli(26), currently prefect of the 
Pontifical Council for the Family, states that in the 
teachings of Dignitas Personae, the Congregation 
for the Doctrine of the Faith, whose responsibility 
is to promote and safeguard the faith and moral 
standards, makes it clear that prenatal adoption, 
even when done solely with the good intention of 
respecting and saving the life of a frozen embryo, 
presents problems similar to those of artificial het-
erologous procreation. We consider it noteworthy 
that the Cardinal does not join this negative as-
sessment of prenatal adoption to save lives to the 
medical, psychological or legal problems that can 
accompany it, but to the surrogacy that this prac-
tice entails.
As regards the extent to which the statements in 
Dignitas Personae should be accepted by Catho-
lics, Antonelli sustains that, while it is thought 
that that the teaching in this Instruction is not 
the definitive opinion of the Magisterium on the 
subject, Catholics should not recommend prena-
tal adoption, because in conscience they should 
follow teaching that reflects the thinking of the 
Church at this time, which is that stated in Dig-
nitas Personae. 
Collard(27), holds that embryo adoption presents 
moral difficulties due to problems related with on-
tology and kinship, besides raising further doubts 
about filiation than any other reproductive tech-
nique. 
María Luisa Di Pietro(28), explicitly rejects pre-
natal adoption, because she considers it the last 
act of an intrinsically immoral procedure. As such, 
she believes that it cannot be accepted in the light 
of any intentionality or circumstance, even if the 
couple adopting were not necessarily complicit in 
the technical procedures that precede the transfer 
of the embryos to the woman’s uterus, and also 
because this adoption can be likened to a form of 
surrogacy or heterologous fertilisation, both ethi-
cally illicit. 
Our opinion on the morality of embryo adop-
tion
Sources of morality
In order to be able to support an opinion on the 
moral assessment of embryo adoption, we must 
refer, albeit succinctly, to the so-called sources of 
morality, which are essentially three: the object; the 
end or intention; and the circumstances, although 
they may also consider the means.
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The object of the human act is that which the ac-
tion by its own nature tends to, regardless of the 
circumstances that may accompany it(29). The 
object is thus the specific action carried out. If we 
examine this in a little more depth, we can say that 
the object of a human action (understanding by 
“human action” an act that arises from the will 
guided by reason) is the content that specifies that 
action as a certain type of action. So-called “moral 
objects” are the objects of the rationally-guided 
will’s choices to do something. Therefore, the ob-
jects of human actions are not simply naturally-
given goals of habits or inclinations, nor “things” 
in relation to which we do something, for which 
we aim or which appear in our actions; rather, the 
objects of the action are, as Thomas of Aquinas 
says, formal principles of action as are capable by 
reason(30).
Having defined what is called the object of hu-
man acts, we must determine to what extent the 
morality of those acts is specified fundamentally 
by the object thereof. In fact, “the morality of the 
human act depends primarily and fundamentally 
on the “object” rationally chosen by the deliberate 
will(31), since “the object chosen morally specifies 
the act of the will, insofar as reason recognizes and 
judges it to be or not to be in conformity with the 
true good”(32). The morality of the human act is 
therefore determined by its moral object, which is 
its goal in terms of the moral concerned.
As regards the end, this refers to the intentionality 
or purpose intended by the acting subject(29,33). 
The Catechism of the Catholic Church defines it 
in these terms: “The intention is a movement of 
the will toward the end: it is concerned with the 
goal of the activity. It aims at the good anticipated 
from the action undertaken”(32, n. 1752).
We must also consider the means used to obtain 
the desired end. In this respect, it must be stated 
that the means also condition the moral assess-
ment of human acts. Therefore, a good end can 
become morally illicit when evil means are used. 
Likewise, the end can make an indifferent action 
good or evil, or can also make an act that is good 
or evil itself better or worse, but can never make 
an evil action good. The end never justifies the 
means(34). 
In terms of the circumstances, these are understood 
to be those accidental conditions that modify the 
already existing moral substance of the human 
act. There are two classes of circumstances: those 
that change the moral species of human acts, and 
those that exacerbate or diminish them. The cir-
cumstances play an important role in the moral 
judgement of an action, contributing to increas-
ing or diminishing its moral goodness or malice, 
and can also mitigate or increase the agent’s re-
sponsibility(33:106), although the circumstances 
of themselves cannot change the moral quality of 
the acts. They cannot make either good or right an 
action that is in itself evil(32, n. 1751).
We must also consider the means used to obtain 
the desired end. In this respect, it must be stated 
that the means also qualify the moral judgement 
of human acts. Therefore, a good end can be made 
morally illicit when illicit means are used to obtain 
it.
Our opinion 
In embryo adoption, in our opinion, the moral 
object of the action is to thaw a frozen human 
embryo and transfer it to the womb of a woman 
other than its biological mother. This action, in 
terms of its object, could be qualified in principle 
as morally illicit, since it intentionally subjects the 
embryo to a disproportionate risk of death, which 
is induced by the act of thawing itself. In contrast, 
when the embryo is left frozen it can die; however, 
this death is not personally induced, but is the 
natural consequence of the frozen embryo’s situ-
ation of irreparable indignity. In the first case, an 
action is performed that might directly cause the 
death of a human embryo, while in the second, a 
situation that can lead to death is not intentionally 
changed, but neither is it directly provoked, both 
circumstances with very different moral classifica-
tion.
However, some authors maintain that the act of 
thawing in itself is positive, as is offers the embryo 
the possibility of returning to its normal biological 
state, resolving the situation of undignified aban-
donment in which it finds itself. 
In our opinion, however, this is not the main ethi-
cal difficulty of thawing frozen embryos, and may 
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not even be an objective difficulty; we believe that 
the main moral difficulty lies in the surrogacy that 
the adoption involves. 
To substantiate this assertion, we need to return 
to point 19 of Dignitas Personae. This indicates 
two reasons that support the moral illicitness of 
embryo adoption. The first is that the adoption 
“is not ethically acceptable for the same reasons 
which make artificial heterologous procreation il-
licit”, and the second that its illicitness is based on 
the same reasons as “any form of surrogate moth-
erhood”.
We shall address the first question. From our point 
of view, the moral illicitness of embryo adoption 
cannot be compared to the moral illicitness of as-
sisted procreation, since in assisted reproduction 
the moral illicitness depends, as specified very 
clearly in the Instruction, on the anthropological, 
medical and theological difficulties of the “pro-
duction” of a child, i.e. the means used to create 
it. There is no doubt that the means used to cre-
ate it is not morally acceptable, as a human being 
should be procreated within the gift of love that 
is given in the conjugal act, when this takes place 
within marriage. As such, any technique used to 
produce a human being outside that marital rela-
tionship must be morally rejected. 
In the light of this criterion, all artificial fertilisa-
tion techniques, both heterologous and homolo-
gous, that replace the marital act must be excluded 
as morally illicit; only those techniques that are 
established as an aid to the conjugal act and its 
fertility are morally acceptable(35).
That is, the illicitness of assisted creation is pri-
marily linked to the improper means of producing 
the child, but it does not affect the dignity of that 
child once created, dignity that is inseparable from 
its own nature of human person and child of God.
Therefore, we believe that the reasons used to sup-
port the moral illicitness of assisted procreation 
cannot be employed to support embryo adoption, 
since in this case the embryo is already produced. 
Therefore, the potential moral illicitness of its ma-
nipulation cannot be linked to its production, but 
to the solution given to the situation of irreparable 
damage in which that frozen embryo finds itself, 
a situation that, as indicated in the Instruction, is 
incompatible with its dignity as a human person. 
With respect to the second question, that which 
bases the moral illicitness of embryo adoption on 
the surrogacy that occurs in it, we think it neces-
sary to clearly define the meaning of this term; a 
“surrogate” in essence can be defined as “a person 
or thing that takes the place or performs the duties 
of someone or something else”(36). Hence, we are 
of the opinion that the use of the term surrogacy 
used in Dignitas Personae, should be framed in this 
context, that of replacing the biological mother 
with another woman for the gestation. 
But why can surrogacy be described as morally 
illicit? In order to try to clarify this, we shall re-
fer to point A-3 of Donum Vitae(6), in which it 
states that “Surrogate motherhood represents an 
objective failure to meet the obligations of ma-
ternal love, of conjugal fidelity and of responsible 
motherhood; it offends the dignity and the right 
of the child to be conceived, carried in the womb, 
brought into the world and brought up by his 
own parents”.
Why, though, does the immorality of surrogacy 
make embryo adoption morally illicit? In order to 
examine this in more depth, we need to extend 
the framework that determines the immorality of 
assisted procreation which, as we know, focuses 
primarily on the rupture of the inseparable unity 
of the conjugal act, fertilisation of the ovum and 
consequent generation of the embryo; i.e. on the 
rupture of a biological act that has an unquestion-
able moral repercussion. 
However, when assessing the moral licitness or il-
licitness of embryo adoption, we are of the opin-
ion that we cannot refer to a unitary act, but to a 
biological process, consisting of: the conjugal act, 
fertilisation of an ovum, generation of an embryo 
and subsequent implantation of the embryo in the 
mother’s womb. Consequently, any interruption, 
rupture or modification of that procreative process 
that affects its bio-ontological unity could make it 
morally illicit. And this is where, in our opinion, 
we must consider the role that surrogacy has in the 
moral assessment of embryo adoption, because if 
one constituent of the aforementioned reproduc-
tive process (in this case surrogacy) is morally il-
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licit, it makes the entire process illicit.  
Our belief that the moral foundation of embryo 
adoption is based on the fracture of the procreative 
process coincides with that expressed by Roberto 
Colombo(37), when he stated that “come potreb-
be una ‘destinazione’ degli embrioni “abbando-
nati” contemplare una soluzione che si coloca nel 
segno di questas tessa rottura traumatica dell’unità 
e integritàtra la genitorialità, il concepimento e la 
gestazione che è all’origine dell’ indignitor acon-
dizione in cui essi versano?”.  In other words, Co-
lombo uses our same argument, that the rupture 
of the unity of the procreative process, as we have 
called it, is the basis and foundation of the non-
moral licitness of embryo adoption. As Colombo 
states in the aforementioned article, “la risposta 
all’ingiustizia non è mai un’ altra ingiustizia”.
An additional but important aspect in relation to 
the matter concerned, is that all the arguments put 
forward to support the moral illicitness of embryo 
adoption are based on the Spanish text of Dignitas 
Personae(7). Some have argued however, that the 
Spanish text used may not be a reliable translation 
of the original Latin text, and that consequently 
our reasoning could be flawed, having used an er-
roneous base to develop it. Therefore, we consult-
ed the Latin text of the Instruction, which reads 
thus in point 19, paragraphs 3 and 4:
3. Propositum quoque eos suppeditandi coniugi-
bus infertilitate laborantibus, tamquam « thera-
piaminfertilitatis», illicita est, ratione ethica spec-
tata, propter easdem rationes quae illicitam faci-
unt et procreationem artificiosam heterologam et 
quamlibet formam maternitatis surrogatae; quae 
methodus praeterea secumfert innumeras alias dif-
ficultates generis medici, psychologici et iuridici.
4. Consilium praeterea a quibusdam in medio est-
positum, ad unum finem opportunitatis nascendi 
dandae creaturis humanis, quae sin aliter certo 
exstincturae essent, quandam instaurandi formam 
«adoptionis praenatalis». Huiusmodi propositum, 
dignum quod laudetur propter intentionem ob-
servandi et defendendi humanam vitam, secum-
fert tamen varias difficultates, non alias ac supra 
enumeratas.
We also consulted a qualified Latin scholar so that 
he could translate both paragraphs to Spanish; the 
result, translated to English for the reader’s conve-
nience, was as follows:
3. The proposal that these embryos could be put 
at the disposal of infertile couples as a treatment for 
infertility is illicit from an ethical point of view, for 
the same reasons which make artificial heterolo-
gous procreation illicit as well as any form of sur-
rogate motherhood; this practice would also lead 
to other problems of a medical, psychological and 
legal nature.
4. It has also been proposed, solely in order to al-
low human beings to be born who are otherwise 
condemned to destruction, that there could be a 
form of “prenatal adoption”. This proposal, praise-
worthy with regard to the intention of respecting 
and defending human life, presents however vari-
ous problems not dissimilar to those mentioned 
above.
As can be seen, the translated text only differs from 
the Spanish text of Dignitas Personae in the para-
graph that states “is not ethically acceptable”, and 
which the translator of the Latin text has translat-
ed as “is illicit, from an ethical point of view”. In 
other words, both texts refer to the non-ethicality 
of this practice; we will return to this later.
It has also been argued that only in the Spanish 
text of Dignitas Personae, where it refers to embryo 
adoption, is this proposed as “a moral problem”, 
but that this definition does not appear in the Lat-
in text. However, if we review the two paragraphs 
of point 19 of the Spanish version of Dignitas 
Personae, at no time do we find that it refers to “a 
moral problem”.
It is true that in both the Latin text (ilicita est, 
ratione ethica spectata) and in the Spanish one (no 
es éticamente aceptable, it is not ethically accept-
able), the word “ethical” and not “moral” is used, 
but in our opinion, the ethical illicitness expressed 
in this text must refer to the moral illicitness, since 
this term is included in a document, all of moral 
foundation. Moreover, the same paragraph ends 
by stating that “this practice would also lead to 
other problems of a medical, psychological and le-
gal nature”, which undoubtedly presupposes that 
the illicitness cannot be related with these new 
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difficulties, as it includes the word “others”, so it 
certainly has to be moral.
Finally, another reason that could reinforce the 
moral illicitness of embryo adoption is the se-
lection that is usually practiced when they are 
thawed, to transfer the embryo or embryos (gener-
ally never more than two) with the best morpho-
logical conditions. 
This is of course an objectively eugenic technique 
and consequently morally illicit, because the em-
bryos transferred would have been selected accord-
ing to their health and physical conditions. If this 
embryo selection is practiced, it would negatively 
condition the moral licitness of embryo adoption.
Accordingly, we surmise that it is not easy to guar-
antee that the embryos to be transferred will not 
be selected, because it must be remembered that, 
as previously mentioned, assisted reproduction 
clinics, probably not as sensitised to the ethical 
problems to which we refer, focus their marketing 
on the efficacy of the outcomes obtained. This ef-
ficacy is closely linked with achieving the highest 
possible number of pregnancies and healthy chil-
dren born, which may be conditioned by the qual-
ity of the embryos transferred, so their selection is 
critical. This difficulty in avoiding embryo selec-
tion could be a further reason why the Catholic 
Church is morally reticent to adopting embryos, 
since it seems that it is very difficult to guarantee 
that in practice the aforementioned selection cri-
teria are not followed. As a result, in the interests 
of the most elementary principle of moral precau-
tion, this technique would have to be qualified as 
illicit. 
Conclusions
Regardless of the above comments, we are of the 
opinion that the statements in Dignitas Personae 
offer no settled moral assessment of embryo adop-
tion. Thus, we certainly believe that there is no 
impediment to continue investigating the moral 
foundations of this practice, until such times as 
the Catholic Church issues a definitive moral 
judgement on it. 
This position is in line with that expressed by 
Ratzinger(38) on the degrees of assent that must 
be given to documents of the Magisterium of the 
Church, when he stated that: the homily of a cu-
rate requires a different type of assent than the 
pastoral letter of a bishop, and this in turn a differ-
ent type of assent than a decree issued by a pontifi-
cal congregation, which requires a different type 
of assent than a Papal Syllabus, which for its part 
requires a different type of assent than the dogma: 
only the latter requires full assent; criticism is es-
sentially possible at any other level, only it has to 
be subject to an examination of conscience that 
must be deeper the higher the object of the criti-
cism.
However, insofar as this occurs, we consider that 
the best attitude of the Catholic faithful is to fol-
low the moral criteria of Dignitas Personae which, 
in our opinion, is morally against the adoption of 
frozen human embryos.
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